This paper examines the effect of foreign lending on the domestic lending for US global banks. We show that greater foreign loan growth complements, rather than detracts from, domestic commercial lending. Exploiting a confidential data (FFIEC 009) on international loan exposure of US banks, we estimate that a 1% increase in foreign office lending is associated with a 0.6% growth in domestic commercial lending, suggesting complementarity across these lending channels. However, when capital raising is tight during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, we find that foreign lending did come at the expense of domestic lending.
Introduction
As of September 2014, US bank loans to non-bank borrowers outside of the US totaled $4.9 trillion US dollars (BIS 2015) . Given the large volume of cross-border loans, the impact of foreign lending may have a significant impact on the financing and growth of the US domestic economy. This paper examines US global banks and asks: does foreign lending come at the expense of domestic lending?
To understand the cross-border lending decision of global banks, it is natural to adopt the framework used for analyzing foreign and domestic real investment decisions of multinational industrial firms. 1 However, the lack of available data on the geographical location of bank lending has posed a significant challenge. To this end, we exploit a confidential dataset (FFIEC 009) of US bank's foreign country exposure and apply the methodology of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) to identify the relationship between foreign and domestic lending when both are simultaneously decided. 2 Specifically, we construct a bank-specific exposure-weighted foreign GDP growth (also innovations to GDP growth) to instrument for foreign lending of each bank, and use the cross-sectional variation across US global banks for identification.
Our results show that US global banks treat foreign and domestic lending more as complements than substitutes, where we estimate that a 1% increase in foreign lending 1 Papers in the industrial literature include those at the macroeconomic level such as Feldstein (1995) We view our result as the funding side counterpart of real investment made by multinational firms, and as potentially capturing the finances that follow the production side complementarities. Finally, we find that the relationship reverses when bank funding conditions tighten, thus supporting the hypothesis that when capital constraints bind then banks will necessarily trade off lending. This paper contributes to the literature on how banks allocate loan decisions across countries and relates lending patterns of global banks to those observed from real investment made by multinational firms.
Model and Empirical Design
Consider a global bank that lends in the U.S. ("Domestic") and abroad ("Foreign"). Faced with costs, rD and rF, to operate foreign and domestic loans 3 , the bank chooses respective loans volumes given by LD and LF. The bank solves the following optimization problem, with revenue function R(Q(LD,LF),yF) and bank specific foreign lending condition, yF 4 :
At the optimum, both first order conditions (FOC) on LD and LF must be satisfied simultaneously: 3 Since the bank raise funding as one entity, funding costs are the same across domestic and foreign lending.
Therefore, rD and rF differ in the cost of operating loans at home and abroad.
, ,
where operating costs, rD and rF, are parameters in the bank's decision problem. Equations (1) and (2) demonstrate that LD and LF are determined simultaneously. Therefore, a basic OLS estimate that relates changes in foreign and domestic lending, in the below specification, is likely to suffer from simultaneity bias:
where %∆ is the change in domestic C&I Loans for bank i,
5
%∆ is the change in foreign office lending 6 , and are lagged bank specific balance sheet controls.
To address this simultaneity bias, we construct an exogenous variable to instrument for foreign lending and follow a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 7 . Following Desai et al. (2009), we define our instrument, Zit, to be the change in foreign GDP, weighted by the bank's own lagged country exposures:
where zjt is the GDP growth for country j,
, and , is the country exposure of bank i in country j. Then, with our instrument, we run a 2SLS, where the regressions in each stage are specified as follows:
While the above model takes the perspective of a bank's lending decision to illustrate the simultaneity bias, our identification comes from ex-ante cross-sectional differences in the foreign country exposures across US banks, and the assumption that foreign GDP growth is exogenous to the US banks. Indeed, our identification requires that a bank's foreign lending vary with their exposure to a high GDP growth country as compared to a low GDP growth country. While the positive correlation between foreign lending and foreign GDP growth can be interpreted as being driven by productivity shocks or changes in loan demand, our framework can also accommodate alternative explanations for this association. For example, a change in loan servicing cost could also induce higher GDP growth and more foreign lending into the country. For our identification strategy to be valid, we simply require that our foreign country GDP growth instrument be exogenous to the bank, and that it is correlated with the bank's foreign lending.
Data
Our data is based on the confidential regulatory filing FFIEC 009 (CEX) 8 that requires all US banks with $30 million or more in foreign claims to report their exposure by country. We aggregate foreign holdings to the bank holding company (BHC) level and match balance sheet variables using the bank regulatory filing Y9C. Finally, we source real GDP growth data from both World Bank (WB) and the Penn World Tables (PWT) 9 . Our final sample covers the period of 1986 -2011, excludes bank-year observations from offshore financial centers, and winsorsizes around outliers 10 .
We find that while foreign office loan volumes of US banks are concentrated in OECD countries and Latin America, considerable exposure differences across global banks remain. In 2012, the top countries by foreign office loan volume were United Kingdom (31%), Japan (17%), Mexico (7%), Australia (5%), Canada (5%), and Germany (5%), South Korea (4%) and Brazil (4%). Table #1 summarizes the relationship between changes in foreign office lending and changes in domestic C&I lending using various specifications and instruments. Column (1) reports the basic OLS specification in Equation (3) and shows that the change in foreign office lending is positively associated with changes in domestic lending. Since the OLS estimate may be biased, the remainder of Table #1 reports the results for the 2SLS specification, which uses weighted average foreign GDP growth or innovations to foreign GDP growth, to instrument for foreign office lending.
Results and discussion
The first stage regression in Column (2) demonstrates the positive and highly significant For robustness, we also instrument with the residual from a fitted AR(1) process for each country's GDP growth 11 . Column (7) of Table #1 reports the relationship between foreign and domestic lending using the residual of WB GDP data to construct the instrument. Comparable to instrumenting with raw GDP growth, we find a statistically significant estimate of 0.689% on foreign office lending (tstat = 2.385). Similarly, residuals of PWT GDP reported in Column (13) are comparable to the direct PWT GDP data.
The results in Table #1 suggest that foreign lending does not come at the expense of domestic lending, but rather the two loan decisions may be strategic complements.
The Financial Crisis of 2008-2009
Underlying our framework is the assumption that banks make lending decisions first, and then can raise the capital to execute those loans. Otherwise, if capital is fixed, then foreign lending will necessarily come at the expense of lower domestic lending. We test this hypothesis by using the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009 when banks were severely liquidity constrained and capital-raising was extremely difficult. 12 Consistent with our hypothesis on binding capital constraints, we find that the relationship between foreign and domestic lending does differ during versus before the GFC. Table #2 reports our empirical specification applied to the sample period before and during the GFC.
Column (6) shows that indeed during the GFC, a 1% increase in foreign lending leads to a -0.205% reduction in domestic lending, although statistically insignificant (t-stat = 0.445).
When funding is scarce and banks are unable to raise capital to fund all investments, then foreign lending necessarily comes at the expense of domestic lending 13 . Moreover, excluding 12 Correa, Goldberg and Rice (2014) show that global banks utilized internal capital markets during the GFC to repatriate funds from abroad.
the global financial crisis, Columns (2) and (4) confirms the positive relationship between foreign and domestic lending when funding can be raised to support both types of lending.
Summary and conclusions
We present new evidence that foreign and domestic lending decisions made by global banks exhibit a complimentary relationship, similar to real investment decisions made by multinational industrial firms. Exploiting a confidential dataset on individual bank foreign exposure to construct an instrumental variable for foreign lending, our analysis shows that a 1% increase in foreign lending is associated with a 0.6% increase in domestic lending.
Moreover, we find that when capital-raising is limited, foreign and domestic lending instead act as substitutes. to be necessarily coupled with new domestic loans in constructing these products. 14 We leave the exploration of these and other channels for continued research. This table reports regressions of bank-country-year percentage changes of foreign lending activity on the GDP per capita growth. The Column (1) reports an OLS regression of percent change of domestic CI on weighted average percentage change in foreign office loans. Columns (2)- (5) under World Bank GDP report first (2, 4) and second (3, 5) stage regressions with and without control variables and use a World Bank derived GDP instrument for foreign office loans. Columns (8)- (11) under Penn World Table GDP growth do similarly, using a PWT derived GDP instrument. Columns (6)- (7) under WB GDP Residual and Columns (12)- (13) under PWT GDP Residual use innovations to country specific AR(1) GDP processes to derive the instrument (using their respective data sources) and report first and second stage results from this process with controls.
All regressions include Year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by bank, significance levels are *p<0.10;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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